The issue of risk selection is especially important for states that enroll blind and disabled beneficiaries of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in Medicaid managed care. SSI beneficiaries have persistent needs for care, have a wide variety of chronic conditions, and often need atypical and complex services. Risk selection occurs when the health care needs of beneficiaries enrolled in a specific plan differ systematically from the needs of the overall beneficiary population and payments do not reflect those needs. We assess the extent of risk selection among managed care plans for SSI beneficiaries over the first three years of Tennessee's Medicaid managed care program, TennCare. Using claims data containing fee-for-service expenditures prior to enrollment in managed care, we find substantial evidence of persistent risk selection among plans. Results are robust to most alternative measures of risk selection for most plans.
The issue of risk selection is especially important for states that enroll blind and disabled Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneficiaries in Medicaid managed care. SSI beneficiaries have persistent needs for care, have a wide variety of chronic conditions, and often need atypical and complex services. Many will require ongoing management by specialists, particularly those beneficiaries with relatively rare conditions or with mental illness. Furthermore, many SSI beneficiaries require ongoing social support services to address chronic limitations in functioning, and many have conditions that make communicating with providers difficult. The seriousness of these limitations and the underlying medical conditions mean that individuals can experience severe de-clines in their health and independence if proper services are not delivered (Tanenbaum and Hurley 1995; Smith and Ashbaugh 1995) . Managed care plans, which often began by serving healthier, employed populations, will be challenged to arrange for this needed care even if capitation payments accurately reflect the average underlying health care needs of their members. In the face of adverse selection, those challenges can be magnified substantially. First, some plans will be underpaid and may lack resources to provide adequate care. Second, without adjustments to the capitation payment for higher risk beneficiaries, all plans have a disincentive to provide higher quality care because this may attract higher cost enrollees.
Earlier studies have found evidence that risk selection exists for all participants in Tennessee's Medicaid managed care program, Tenn-Care, but no studies have focused on SSI beneficiaries in Medicaid managed care. Using data reported by managed care plans to the state on people with six rare specific conditions, Bailey et al. (1999) found evidence of risk selection in 1994 and 1995: some plans had a much higher prevalence of people with the six conditions. In a second analysis using encounter data, they found additional evidence of risk selection across a wider range of chronic conditions. In both analyses, Bailey et al. found evidence of adverse selection into managed care plans affiliated with medical schools. Neither analysis, however, assessed risk selection relative to payment rates, which are higher for the six conditions and vary among blind/disabled enrollees and other demographic groups. Moreno and Vogel (2001) also conducted two analyses of risk selection among the families and children eligible for TennCare through welfare and related categories. They used methods similar to those in this article, and they used encounter data to compare the prevalence of treated asthma and diabetes across plans. They found evidence of risk selection, with some agreement across their two analyses as to which plans had adverse and favorable selection.
In this article, we assess the extent of risk selection among managed care plans for SSI beneficiaries during TennCare's first two years (starting January 1994 and ending January 1996) . Our analysis starts with a review of the TennCare program, especially the characteristics of the participating managed care plans that may have affected the choices of blind/disabled SSI beneficiaries and the nature of the payment system. Next, we describe our analytic approach, which uses fee-for-service claims data from the period prior to the TennCare program and subsequent plan enrollment. We use data that do not depend on encounter data, because Sing (2001) found that in the early years of TennCare encounters appear to have been underreported, and that underreporting varies by managed care plan. Finally, we describe the overall distribution of SSI beneficiaries among the plans and the evidence of risk selection.
Characteristics of the TennCare Program, 1994 to 1996
When Tennessee established its Medicaid managed care program, called TennCare, in 1994, it became one of the first states to enroll nearly all its SSI beneficiaries in managed care (U.S. General Accounting Office 1996) . Before TennCare, only 6% of all Tennesseans were in managed care (Wooldridge et al. 1996) . In January 1994, Tennessee enrolled almost a quarter of its population, 1.2 million people, into managed care. Among these were the state's Medicaid population of about 800,000, including approximately 150,000 blind/disabled SSI beneficiaries. The TennCare budget for the 1994-95 fiscal year was approximately $2.8 billion.
TennCare Enrollment Process
The TennCare enrollment process sought to match beneficiaries with the plan of their choice or, for those who did not make a choice, with the plan whose network included the providers beneficiaries had used previously. Although the enrollment process succeeded in bringing more than a million people into managed care, it was marred by substantial beneficiary confusion.
Initial enrollment in managed care plans was confusing because TennCare was implemented rapidly and because people were unfamiliar with managed care (Wooldridge et al. 1996) . SSI beneficiaries followed the same enrollment process as other Medicaid beneficiaries, but the state also funded an Advocate Line to provide telephone assistance to people with disabilities or chronic conditions. In October 1993, three months before TennCare began, the state mailed all Medicaid beneficiaries a ballot listing the plans available in their regions, and each beneficiary was asked to select a plan on the ballot. Those who ranked their choices usually received their first choice. Approximately 60% of all Medicaid beneficiaries chose a plan, but the state did not keep statistics about the choices made by SSI beneficiaries or other subgroups or about assignment rates in each plan (Wooldridge et al. 1996) .
The state assigned participants to plans when they did not make an explicit choice or when none of a participant's first three choices was available (eight of the 20 plans listed on the initial ballots never contracted with TennCare). Assignment was a three-stage process used for all TennCare participants, including SSI beneficiaries (Wooldridge et al. 1996) . First, the state reviewed an individual's claims history and tried to identify the primary care provider. It then determined which plan the provider would participate in and assigned the individual to that plan. 1 This stage is likely to have exacerbated adverse selection among health maintenance organizations (HMOs) affiliated with medical schools, because beneficiaries with complex cases who previously had visited providers affiliated with medical schools probably were assigned to these HMOs. If an individual was not assigned to an HMO on the basis of a previous primary care provider, a second stage occurred. The state checked to determine whether a participant had been enrolled in the Tennessee Managed Care Network. Because that HMO was the precursor to Access MedPlus, all former enrollees who had not selected another Tenn-Care plan were assigned to Access MedPlus. Among SSI beneficiaries, this stage affected only the few hundred who had enrolled voluntarily in the Tennessee Managed Care Network prior to TennCare. If an individual had not been enrolled in the Tennessee Managed Care Network, the third stage of the HMO assignment process occurred. The state randomly allocated unassigned participants to managed care plans in the same proportion as participants who had made a selection themselves. The state reported that some attempt was made to ensure that blind/disabled enrollees were distributed proportionately across all plans, but it is not clear how the state did this.
The Health Care Financing Administration required the state to reopen plan choice for 45 days (December 1, 1993 , to January 15, 1994 for two reasons (Wooldridge et al. 1996) . First, eight of the 20 plans listed as choices on the ballot did not sign contracts with the state. Second, information about which providers were participating in each plan was lacking during the initial enrollment period. The TennCare Bureau sought to facilitate consumers' choices during this 45-day period by sending beneficiaries notices of their assigned plans and by notifying them of their opportunity to select new ones. Even after the 45 days, additional switching among plans occurred as some beneficiaries appealed their assignments and subsequently changed plans.
Types of Managed Care Plans, Provider Networks, and Regions in TennCare
Twelve plans participated in the TennCare program in 1994: From the consumer's perspective, the difference between HMOs and PPOs was the state requirement that HMOs have primary care gatekeepers from whom beneficiaries would have to obtain referrals before receiving specialty and nonemergency hospital care. In contrast, the state did not require PPOs to have primary care gatekeepers initially. Nevertheless, four of the five PPOs (HealthNet, OmniCare, PHP, and TennSource) had some form of gatekeeping, leaving BCBS as the only plan that did not require members to obtain referrals before seeing specialists (Harkey and Associates 1996) . Unlike many commercial PPOs, those participating in TennCare covered no out-of-network care. Other contractual requirements were different for HMOs and PPOs. The state capitated both HMOs and PPOs; it placed no limits on HMO administrative costs and allowed them to retain any profits. The state limited the PPOs' administrative costs to 10% of total capitation payments and allowed the PPOs to keep only 5% of any profits they generated (another 5% of profits were supposed to be distributed to providers, with the remaining 90% returned to the state). The PPOs were considered a transition system to help introduce managed care into Tennessee. By January 1997, all TennCare PPOs had converted to HMOs.
The TennCare Bureau divided the state into 12 geographic regions-four urban (Chattanooga, Knoxville, Memphis, and Nashville) and eight rural. It allowed participating plans to enroll members in any or all the regions in which they established adequate provider networks. In most regions during 1994, five to seven plans were available; in two western rural regions, however, beneficiaries could choose only between the two statewide plans, BCBS and Access MedPlus (Table 1) . Six plans were available in four or more regions, and five plans were available in only one region. Each of the three HMOs affiliated with medical schools participated only in the home region of its medical school. This system continued to evolve over time so that, by January 1996, three plans operated statewide (Phoenix went statewide in late 1996) and one HMO, Total Health Plus, had been purchased by BCBS. 2
TennCare's Payment System for Plans
TennCare paid participating plans on a capitated basis, and the capitated payments could be supplemented from a risk payment pool, which was small. All managed care plans were paid the same capitation rates, based on the demographic characteristics and eligibility categories of their members. There were eight rate cells in the system, including a specific cell for people who were under 65 years old, were not Medicare beneficiaries, and were classified as blind or disabled (most of whom were SSI recipients). There were no geographic adjustments to the rates. At the start of TennCare, the rate for blind and disabled beneficiaries was $245 per member per month-more than twice the average rate for all eight groups ($101). Rates were based on average 1993 Tennessee fee-for-service Medicaid expenditures per beneficiary, adjusted for inflation, and discounted for assumed savings from managed care and reductions in charity care and local government expenditures (Wooldridge et al. 1996). 3 Rates increased in July 1994 and annually thereafter.
For PPOs, the state capped management fees at 10% of the capitation payments and required that 90% of any difference between the capitation payments and medical expenses be returned to it. Thus, the state shared profits but not losses with the PPOs. One PPO, OmniCare, repaid the state $14.4 million in 1994-approximately 23% of its TennCare revenues-and owed the state $8 million in 1995, approximately 11% of its TennCare revenues. 4 HMOs were not constrained in this regard.
Capitation payments to plans could be supplemented by payments from a ''high-cost chronic conditions (HCCC)'' risk payment pool.
Plans could apply to the pool for additional payments for members with any of six specific conditions: 1) AIDS, 2) coagulation defects, 3) cystic fibrosis, 4) organ transplants, 5) premature births, and 6) high-risk pregnancies and births. This pool was intended to account for adverse risk selection among all TennCare participants, not just those eligible because they were SSI beneficiaries.
The HCCC risk pool likely played a minor role in compensating for risk selection among SSI enrollees. The pool was funded for a fixed amount each year: $20 million in fiscal year 1994 and $40 million in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, approximately 2.5% of the TennCare capitation budget. 5 The supplemental payments from the pool were based on the average 1993 Medicaid expenditures for treating people with these conditions minus the capitation already paid for the enrollee, prorated to the budgeted amount in the pool each year. In the first yearand-a-half, about 95% of cases for which plans asked for HCCC supplemental payment were pregnancy or premature births, and about half of the HCCC pool was spent on these cases. 6 For the remaining cases, the additional monthly payments ranged from a few hundred dollars for kidney transplant patients to more than $3,000 for bone marrow transplant patients, a considerable addition to the capitation payment (Bailey et al. 1999) . Although the pool covered only a few of the high-cost conditions prevalent among disabled TennCare beneficiaries, Bailey et al.'s data suggest that the pool helped the HMOs affiliated with medical schools, which had considerable adverse selection for high-cost chronic conditions. Data are not available by capitation rate cell or eligibility group, but even if all the HCCC risk payments not spent on pregnancies and premature births were paid for SSI enrollees, this would amount to less than 5% of capitation payments for this group. 7
Factors Likely Affecting Choice and Risk Selection
Federal and state policies that gave Medicaid beneficiaries choices among managed care plans, differences in plan characteristics, and the assignment process for those who did not choose the plans combined to produce risk selection. Risk selection arises when plans differ, beneficiaries are free to choose the plan that ap- pears most likely to meet their needs, and payments do not reflect beneficiaries' needs. TennCare allowed beneficiary choice and had substantial differences among the participating managed care plans. The major differences among plans were in their provider networks, gatekeeping policies, name recognition, supplemental benefits, and marketing approaches. Provider networks. The networks of HMOs affiliated with medical schools were distinguished by the skills and reputation of those schools, which likely make the HMOs affiliated with medical schools more attractive to people with the greatest medical needs (Retchin 1998 ). Bailey et al. (1999) found that TennCare enrollees in the three plans affiliated with medical schools were more likely to have high-cost chronic conditions. Beneficiaries also were able to enroll in PPOs that offered access to providers affiliated with medical schools in the three regions with a medical school (Memphis, Nashville, and Knoxville). The networks of BCBS, HealthNet, and PHP included the hospitals affiliated with medical schools, and, in these regions, the PPOs' networks had larger numbers of specialists than were in the networks of HMOs affiliated with medical schools (Harkey 1995) . These three PPOs also may have been attractive to people with the greatest medical needs.
Gatekeeping policies. BCBS was the one plan that did not have gatekeepers at the beginning of TennCare (eventually, the state required it to have gatekeepers starting in 1997). As a result, this plan may have been more attractive to those SSI beneficiaries who had been using specialty providers in the past or who anticipated needing easy access to such providers in the future. Numerous studies have found that plans with rigid gatekeeping systems have favorable selection (Hellinger 1995) .
Name recognition. The name recognition of the BCBS plan may have been particularly important for the choices of TennCare beneficiaries. Managed care was essentially new to Tennessee in 1994, and the 12 plans in TennCare had virtually no experience by which beneficiaries could judge their likely performance. Access MedPlus had operated a voluntary Medicaid managed care plan in western Tennessee, but despite its track record, consumers may have had difficulty assessing its reputation because the earlier plan had a different name and did not operate statewide. Name recognition, if linked to a reputation for quality or good service, may attract high-risk cases. On the other hand, enrollees with worse health may be willing to look beyond name recognition for more in-depth information, leaving those in better health responding to name recognition. 8 Supplemental benefits. Under TennCare's guidelines, the plans could add supplemental benefits to the TennCare benefit package of Medicaid acute care services, and some did so. For example, Access MedPlus offered reduced rates for routine adult dental care and vision care, an incentive program for pregnant women, and some free over-the-counter medications. 9 Prudential offered extra coverage for adult emergency dental visits, and added preventive dental visits in 1996. TLC offered free home pregnancy tests. BCBS did not offer any extra benefits. Some plans offered credit cards and free diapers, which might attract people with few health care needs, while those with greater needs (and higher costs) might make their choice on the basis of reputation for quality or access to expertise in chronic conditions and disability.
Marketing approaches. Unlike many other states, Tennessee permitted direct marketing by the plans, which some analysts believe can result in favorable selection (Newhouse, Beeuwkes Buntin, and Chapman 1997) . The plans' initial marketing strategies ranged from the intensive outreach and advertising efforts of Access MedPlus to almost no ongoing marketing by VHP (Wooldridge et al. 1996) . Two of the HMOs affiliated with medical schools (TLC and VHP) initially focused their marketing and recruiting efforts on patients from the schools' hospitals and clinics, a marketing focus that is likely to result in adverse selection. OmniCare's aggressive marketing practices might have resulted in favorable selection. At the start of TennCare, OmniCare retained independent marketing agents, some of whom enrolled people released from prison and other people not eligible for TennCare (Tennessee Comptroller of the Treasury 1995). People also were switched to OmniCare without their knowledge. The state later found that OmniCare was spending a significantly lower proportion of its gross Tenn-Care revenues on patient care than other plans. That finding suggests overall favorable selection at OmniCare, including the likelihood of favorable selection among SSI beneficiaries. In May 1994, the state published marketing guidelines that constrained the managed care plans' marketing activities. The new rules required that the state approve all marketing materials, including advertisements and brochures, before they were printed or aired. These guidelines disallowed such marketing devices as offering credit cards, but continued to allow some practices that are not permitted in other states, such as door-todoor marketing.
Data and Methods

Sample Selection
We examine risk selection in one rate cell over time using administrative data from 1993 through 1996. To select the study sample, we started with all blind and disabled SSI beneficiaries younger than age 65 who were enrolled in Medicaid throughout 1993, and who were not simultaneously enrolled in Medicare. 10, 11 We selected 1993 beneficiaries to be able to construct a measure of expected medical costs under TennCare using prior Medicaid expenditure data. We then added TennCare plan enrollment data from 1994 through 1996. To compare risk selection through time for a consistent sample, we selected beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid throughout 1993 and enrolled in TennCare in October 1994, January 1995, and January 1996, and we excluded those who were elderly or dually eligible for Medicare at those times. Our final sample of 78,770 SSI beneficiaries accounts for 63% of all the SSI beneficiaries who were enrolled in TennCare on October 1, 1994, and were under 65 years old and not in Medicare.
Our sample is similar to the overall population of nonelderly Tennessee SSI beneficiaries, except that our sample contains a somewhat smaller proportion of beneficiaries between ages 45 and 64. This slight age difference is due to our requirement that sample members be under age 65 throughout the entire period. SSI beneficiaries who enrolled after 1993 had a similar pattern of enrollment in the managed care plans, but were somewhat more likely to enroll in OmniCare and less likely to enroll in Access MedPlus. However, we do not know the prior expenditures of beneficiaries who enrolled after 1993. To the extent that we could examine the degree of risk selection for the groups of SSI beneficiaries excluded from the sample, their results were consistent with those for our analysis sample. For example, results from a preliminary analysis using a slightly larger sample of 82,288 SSI beneficiaries enrolled through January 1995 were consistent with the results for the smaller sample presented in this article.
Sample Characteristics and Expenditures
Slightly more than half of our sample of SSI beneficiaries was female, close to 60% were white, and about 30% were black ( Table 2 ). The average age at the time of sample selection was 34. Sixty percent of the sample resided in a rural region of TennCare, about 20% of the beneficiaries resided in the Memphis region and another 20% resided in the three other urban regions. We combined blind and disabled SSI beneficiaries in our analysis because in 1993, blind SSI beneficiaries were less than 2% of blind or disabled SSI beneficiaries, they shared the same capitation rate, and mean expenditures for blind SSI beneficiaries tended to be about three-quarters of mean expenditures for disabled SSI beneficiaries (Social Security Bulletin 1999; U.S. House of Representatives 1998). 12 During the year preceding TennCare enrollment (1993), beneficiaries in our sample had highly variable and greatly skewed Medicaid expenditures and utilization ( Table 2 ). The average monthly expenditure was $228, but the median monthly expenditure was only $81, and one in eight beneficiaries had no expenditures during the year. 13 In the upper tail of the distribution, 10% of the sample members had monthly Medicaid expenditures that exceeded $579, and 5% had monthly expenditures exceeding $929. The maximum level of expenditures was more than $16,000 per month. With respect to service utilization, beneficiaries in our sample averaged almost 12 ambulatory visits during 1993. However, only one-third of the sample actually had 12 or more visits that year. About 12% had no visits, whereas 10% had more than 28 visits. Approximately 15% of beneficiaries had an inpatient stay for a reason not related to mental health. There were 1,388 inpatient days per 1,000 beneficiaries.
In all our analyses, we focus only on those 1993 Medicaid costs that correspond to services subsequently covered by TennCare plans in 1994 through 1996. Thus, the expenditures shown in Table 2 and our risk measures pertain to services for which TennCare plans were responsible, which reflect about 70% of total Medicaid expenditures for the sample. Excluded from TennCare plans' benefits were mental health services for adults with severe and persistent mental illness, mental health services for children with severe emotional disturbances, and the institutional cost of stays in long-termcare facilities. 14
Measuring Relative Risk Levels of Each Plan's Enrollees
To measure the extent of risk selection among TennCare plans, we used beneficiaries' 1993 (that is, pre-TennCare) health care experiences to construct a risk index for each plan. First, we adjusted expenditures for regional variations, and then constructed an index equal to the ratio of the average, regionally adjusted, monthly 1993 expenditure among SSI beneficiaries who enrolled in a given plan to the overall sample average ($228).
Regional adjustment. Because only three of the 12 TennCare plans accepted enrollment in six or more of the 12 regions of the state, regional variation in underlying practice norms and prices could be confounded with variation in enrollee health status across plans. Average 1993 Medicaid expenditures and utilization among SSI beneficiaries varied widely among regions. On the basis of beneficiaries' regions of residence in 1994, for example, mean 1993 Medicaid expenditures varied from $169 per month in Memphis to $300 per month in Knoxville, both urban areas with medical schools. Because of this regional expenditure variation and the lack of geographic adjustments to rates, plans that enrolled beneficiaries from only one or two regions in the state might have enrollees with lower expenditures relative to the statewide TennCare program due to factors other than health status.
We control for regional variation by scaling the mean (1993) expenditure level in each region to be equal to the overall mean, $228. For example, the expenditures of each SSI beneficiary in Memphis were increased by 34.9% ($228 Ϭ $169) to account for the relatively low average expenditures ($169) for beneficiaries in the Memphis region.
Basic risk index. The basic risk index is the ratio of the average, regionally adjusted, monthly 1993 expenditure among SSI beneficiaries who enrolled in a given plan to the overall sample average ($228). Thus, for example, if the mean, regionally adjusted, monthly 1993 expenditure for those who enrolled in a given plan was $280, then that plan would have a risk index of 1.23 ($280 Ϭ $228), suggesting that it had experienced adverse selection. We report significance levels from difference of means tests comparing the mean in expenditures for those who enrolled in a given plan with all other SSI beneficiaries. Tests also compare mean expenditures for those who enrolled in a given plan type (for example, PPO) with all other SSI beneficiaries.
The index is a good indicator of risk levels because of the high year-to-year correlation among expenditures for blind and disabled Medicaid beneficiaries. Kronick, Zhou, and Dreyfus (1995) found that fee-for-service ex-penditures in one year were highly predictive of expenditures in the following year for this population (they found correlations that ranged from .55 to .72). Furthermore, they found that mean annual expenditures varied little from year to year for groups of beneficiaries with specific chronic conditions.
Alternative Risk Indexes
Given the skewed distribution of Medicaid expenditures, the basic risk index might be unduly affected by a small number of beneficiaries with very high expenditures, particularly in smaller plans where just a few outliers could affect significantly mean expenditures for an entire plan. To eliminate the effects of outliers, we used median 1993 Medicaid expenditures for beneficiaries enrolled in each plan to construct an alternative risk index. We adjusted for regional differences by scaling expenditures so that the median in each region was equal to the median overall. As with the basic risk index, this alternative risk index for a plan was the ratio of median, regionally adjusted expenditures among SSI beneficiaries subsequently enrolled in the plan to the median for all SSI beneficiaries. We used median score tests to compare the median expenditures for those who enrolled in a given plan with all other SSI beneficiaries. This measure, however, removed the effects of the highest-cost cases and, hence, was not the most appropriate measure of risk selection.
In addition, we investigated the sensitivity of our results by constructing several risk indices using alternative measures of regionally adjusted expenditures and service use. We used the percentage of SSI beneficiaries in each plan who had expenditures in 1993 and the percentage of SSI beneficiaries in each plan who were in the top expenditure decile (among all beneficiaries) during 1993. We adjusted for regional variation by scaling the percentage in each region to be equal to the percentage overall. Finally, four service use measures (estimated using the pre-TennCare data from 1993) constituted alternatives to expenditures as predictors of risks: 1) mean annual ambulatory visits, 2) percentage of beneficiaries with 12 or more office visits, 3) mean annual inpatient days, and 4) percentage of beneficiaries with an inpatient stay during the year. To calculate risk indices using these measures, we first regionally adjusted ambulatory visits and inpatient days for each person in the same manner as expenditures were adjusted, and we rescaled the regional percentages to be equal to the percentage overall. The risk index for each of these alternative measures was the ratio of the regionally adjusted measure among SSI beneficiaries subsequently enrolled in the plan to the measure for all SSI beneficiaries. Difference of means and difference of proportions tests were used.
Plan Switchers
Altman, Cutler, and Zeckhauser (1998) found that plan switching among the privately insured affects risk selection between fee-for-service and HMOs in three ways: 1) people who switch from fee-for-service plans to HMOs are healthier than those who stay; 2) people who switch from HMOs to fee-for-service plans are less healthy than those who stay; and 3) those who remain in fee-for-service plans are older and hence their health costs rise more rapidly. To investigate the role of plan switching in exacerbating or mitigating risk selection among managed care plans, we calculated risk indexes for the groups of SSI beneficiaries switching to any plan, those not switching plans, those leaving each plan, and those entering each plan. For each plan, we used difference of means tests to compare the regionally adjusted expenditures of these three groups.
Results
Distribution of Blind and Disabled SSI Beneficiaries Among Plans
By October 1994, beneficiaries had two opportunities to select a plan so they had a chance to learn about TennCare and the participating plans before choosing their plans. Those consumers who initially were assigned to plans had an opportunity to choose another plan. Consumers had further opportunity to understand information about the plans available from their physicians, the plans' extensive marketing, and the Advocate Line.
In October 1994, 10 months after beneficiaries were given the initial opportunities to choose a plan, SSI beneficiaries and families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) had similar enrollment patterns (Figure 1) . The two statewide plans had by far 1, 1994 , Jan. 1, 1995 , and Jan. 1, 1996 . It excludes SSI beneficiaries over age 65, dual eligibles, and people in a capitated plan in 1993.) the highest enrollments: BCBS enrolled roughly 40% of AFDC and SSI beneficiaries, while Access MedPlus enrolled 31%. BCBS had the largest market share in most regions, although Access MedPlus had the largest share in Memphis, and the market shares of the two plans were about equal in Chattanooga. The marketing success of BCBS might have been related to its name recognition and lack of gatekeepers. Some plans with low total enrollments were nonetheless important in particular regions, and at the regional level some plans were more important to SSI beneficiaries. Each of the three HMOs affiliated with a medical school had between 17% and 19% of the SSI enrollment in its respective urban region. In Nashville and Knoxville, a greater percentage of SSI beneficiaries than AFDC families enrolled in the HMOs affiliated with a medical school, a finding consistent with these HMOs being more attractive to people with greater health care needs. 15 Other plans with large regional market shares were HealthNet, OmniCare, Phoenix, and PHP.
In October 1994 and each year thereafter, TennCare participants could choose a new plan for the forthcoming calendar year. Enrollment of our sample in BCBS increased at the expense of all other plans so that by January 1996, 51% of SSI beneficiaries were in BCBS (up from 41% in October 1994). This pattern was similar for AFDC families; by January 1996, 48% of them were in BCBS. Otherwise, changes were minor. TennCare, 1994 Through 1996 For 1994-the first year of the TennCare program-the basic risk index (constructed from mean 1993 regionally adjusted Medicaid expenditures) indicates substantial risk selection across the 12 TennCare plans (Table 3) . Five plans experienced adverse selection. TLC, the HMO sponsored by the University of Tennessee Medical Group and the Regional Medical Center, had the most severe adverse selection, with a risk index of 1.51. This index indicates that the 1993 regionally adjusted Medicaid expenditures for the disabled SSI beneficiaries who enrolled in TLC were 51% above the 1993 average for all disabled SSI beneficiaries in our sample. All five plans experiencing statistically Files, 1993 , and TennCare enrollment files, October 1994 , January 1995 , and January 1996 . Notes: Risk selection for a given plan is calculated as the mean (1993) regionally adjusted Medicaid expenditures for beneficiaries in the plan, adjusted for regional differences in the mean, divided by the mean for all beneficiaries in our sample. a This is the number of blind or disabled SSI beneficiaries who were: 1) in our sample, and 2) enrolled in the plan in October 1994. The sample is all SSI beneficiaries who were less than 65 years old, not eligible for Medicare, covered by Medicaid for all of 1993, and enrolled in TennCare in October 1994, January 1995, and January 1996. * Significantly different from other MCOs at the 5% level. * * Significantly different from other MCOs at the 1% level. ‡ Significantly different from zero at the 1% level. significant adverse selection either were affiliated with or contracted with a medical school.
Evidence of Risk Selection in
Five plans had favorable selection in 1994. This group included three of the four HMOs that were not affiliated with medical schools (Access MedPlus, Phoenix, and Prudential) and two relatively small PPOs (OmniCare and Tenn-Source). Prudential, which enrolled only 3% of SSI beneficiaries in Memphis (the only region in which this plan operated), realized the most favorable selection with a risk index of just .69. Access MedPlus, the second largest plan, and TennSource, a small plan, fared well, both with a risk index of .76. Total Health and John Deere did not experience statistically significant risk selection.
The pattern of risk selection did not change substantially from October 1994 through January 1996, even though TennCare enrollees had annual opportunities to change plans (Table 3) . All five with adverse selection in 1994 had adverse selection in 1996, and all five plans with favorable selection in 1994 continued to have favorable selection in 1996. Only Access MedPlus had a statistically significant change in its risk index-in the direction of even more favorable selection-from .75 in 1994 to .69 in 1996.
Sensitivity to Alternative Measures of Risk Selection
The selection results were consistent among most alternative measures of risk for most plans (Table 4 ). Five plans had adverse selection across all measures and four had favorable selection across all measures. Risk indexes for OmniCare, Total Health, and John Deere varied between favorable and adverse selection. Among the four largest plans (BCBS, HealthNet, PHP, and Access MedPlus), the magnitude of the risk selection was similar for the risk indexes based on mean expenditures and the four measures of utilization. The risk index based on median expenditures varied much more across plans than the index based on mean expenditures, which suggests that outliers did not drive risk selection among plans but rather differences in the middle of the distribution were an important factor in risk selection for SSI enrollees once regional variation was taken into account. However, the risk index based on the percentage with positive expenditures varied less across plans, suggesting that the healthiest SSI enrollees (those with no expenditures) were not a large factor in risk selection. Only the indexes based on the means included the effects of the highest and lowest cost cases, and hence were the most appropriate measures of risk selection
Effects of Plan Switching on Risk Selection
Risk selection varied little between 1994 and 1996 because few SSI beneficiaries in our sample switched plans during this period. Twelve percent of beneficiaries switched plans between 1994 and 1995 (only 9% switched between 1995 and 1996) . Another reason for the stability in risk indices was that the risk of new TennCare enrollees was not measured. Plan switching sometimes increased and sometimes reduced risk selection during the study period, but these changes tended to be modest and were rarely statistically significant. For example, the group that left BCBS in 1995 had a risk index of .89, lower than those who remained (who had a risk index of 1.15), thereby exacerbating adverse selection toward BCBS (Table 5 ). On the other hand, those who joined HealthNet in 1995 had a risk index of .90, lower than those who were already in the plan (1.24), thereby mitigating HealthNet's adverse selection. On average, during the period October 1994 to January 1995, beneficiaries who switched and who did not switch plans had similar regionally adjusted mean expenditures. The findings both differ from and are similar to those of Altman, Cutler, and Zeckhauser (1998) , who found plan switching exacerbated risk selection between HMOs and fee-for-service plans. We found plan switching exacerbated risk selection against BCBS, the only plan without gatekeepers and hence the most similar to a fee-for-service plan. We did not find, however, that plan switching generally exacerbated Note: The risk index for a given plan is calculated as the mean 1993 Medicaid expenditures for beneficiaries in the plan, adjusted for regional differences in the mean, divided by the mean for all beneficiaries. * Significantly different from those who stayed in the plan at the 5% level. * * Significantly different from those who stayed in the plan at the 1% level. † Significantly different from those who left the plan at the 5% level. ‡ Significantly different from those who left the plan at the 1% level.
risk selection. Our findings may differ because we studied switching among managed care plans-rather than between managed care and fee-for-service plans-because the populations of consumers differ, and because we have smaller samples of switchers to and from some plans.
Discussion
There is evidence of substantial risk selection among SSI TennCare beneficiaries' choices of managed care plans in TennCare. In particular, blind and disabled SSI beneficiaries with higher than average health care needs disproportionately enrolled in five plans; beneficiaries with relatively low needs disproportionately enrolled in four other plans, and three plans had mixed evidence on the direction of risk selection. Risk index scores ranged from .69 (Prudential) to 1.51 (TLC). The degree of adverse selection could not be explained by regional variations in beneficiary costs and was consistent over time and generally across alternative risk indexes. These results are similar in some ways to those of Bailey et al. (1999) and Moreno and Vogel (2001) , but they also suggest that generalizing about plan types is difficult and analysis of population subgroups is important. Among all TennCare enrollees, Bailey et al. found selection against HMOs affiliated with medical schools, as did we. Bailey et al. aggregated the other plans into two types, statewide and regional, and we found considerable diversity within these types. For example, BCBS and Access MedPlus were the two statewide plans; one had favorable selection and the other adverse selection. There were also diverse experiences within the categories of plans used in our study, suggesting that broad plan types are not always useful in assessing risk selection. Among the families and children who were eligible through welfare and related eligibility categories and who remained in TennCare through 1996, Moreno and Vogel found a somewhat similar pattern of risk selection among the plans; however, they did not find adverse selection against HMOs affiliated with medical schools after ad-justing for regional variations. By comparison, our findings suggest most plans experience greater risk selection among SSI beneficiaries. Provider networks and marketing approaches appear to be associated with patterns of risk selection, but the role of these and other factors in patterns of risk selection requires additional research. Two of the three HMOs affiliated with medical schools (TLC and VHP), as well as all three PPOs with networks that included the hospitals affiliated with medical schools (BCBS, HealthNet, and PHP), experienced adverse selection; no other plan had evidence of adverse selection that was consistent across years and measures. Initially, TLC and VHP marketed to hospital and clinic users and they had the highest risk indexes, including the highest risk indexes based on prior hospital use. Aggressive marketing may have accounted for OmniCare's favorable selection, but we did not have information on every plan's marketing approach. BCBS' name recognition and lack of gatekeeping did not appear to have resulted in any better or worse adverse selection than the other adversely selected PPOs.
Our findings suggest that states may need payment systems that match plan compensation with the expected needs of plan enrollees so that plans have incentives to serve SSI enrollees with greater needs. Tennessee has recognized this, and in 2001 the state replaced the HCCC risk payment pool with risk adjustment and risk sharing between the state and plans; it also removed SSI children from capitated managed care. Although TennCare's HCCC risk payment pool helped plans with some high-cost cases, a more comprehensive risk pool that is better funded and includes a wider array of conditions could better match payments to health care needs. Such a pool probably would need to be very large, perhaps accounting for a quarter to more than half of all payments to plans (Newhouse, Beeuwkes-Buntin, and Chapman 1997). Instead, beginning in 2001, the state contract permitted risk adjustment using the Chronic Disease and Disability Payment System, which uses diagnoses reported in encounter data and which have been found to be highly predictive of future costs (Kronick et al. 2001) . The state also offered managed care plans two new payment options to share risk between the plans and the state. Subsequently, the state accepted proposals from four HMOs that had not contracted with TennCare previously. The two options differ only in the thresholds at which the state shares in risks: 1) at the capitation rate, or 2) 2% above or below the capitation rate. The state receives a greater share of gains than losses (70% of gains and 50% of losses), up to 10% of the capitation payments. When gains and losses exceed 10% of the capitation payments, the state shares 90% of both gains and losses, declining to 70% in the third year of the contract. The risk indexes calculated for this article are for SSI enrollees alone and do not correspond to plans' actual gains and losses; however, the magnitudes of differences in risk suggest that nearly all plans might share gains or losses with the state if they selected a risk-sharing option. Risk-sharing payment options and risk adjustment might give plans more incentive to serve SSI enrollees with greater needs.
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1 It is not clear how the state assigned enrollees with multiple providers, particularly enrollees with providers in the networks of more than one plan.
2 BCBS purchased Total Health Plus in October 1995 and was in the process of combining it with its Blue Care plan in January 1996. 3 The cumulative discount was over 30%. Actuarial studies suggest that TennCare was underfunded in general, but studies do not indicate whether the capitation payments for specific groups were too low (Hunt et al. 1999 ). 4 Authors' calculations, based on Harkey and Associates (1995) , Tennessee Comptroller of the Treasury (1995), and Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance (1995) . 5 In the beginning of TennCare operations, a second pool compensated managed care plans for above-average utilization. The funds from the second pool were combined with the ''high-cost pool'' (letter from Rusty Siebert, TennCare Bureau Chief, June 28, 1995). 6 Authors' calculations, based on data presented in Bailey et al. (1999) . 7 In addition to the risk pool, managed care plans also may reinsure against high costs, but information on these private arrangements is not available. An anonymous reviewer reports that anecdotal evidence suggests that reinsurance premiums do not closely reflect the risks of SSI beneficiaries, so reinsurance can mitigate the financial impact of risk selection in the short run. 8 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 9 During the first year of TennCare, Access
MedPlus also offered benefits for accidental death or disability. However, the state disallowed this supplemental benefit after the first year. 10 We exclude those dually eligible for Medicaid and Medicare because TennCare is not the primary payer for this group, there were few benefits for the plans to manage, and the plans received a different capitation rate for them. This group accounts for approximately 25% of the total population of SSI beneficiaries in Tennessee who are blind or disabled. 11 Due to litigation unique to Tennessee, when SSI beneficiaries lose their SSI benefits, they remain in Medicaid. Our sample includes both current and former SSI beneficiaries because neither TennCare capitation rates nor the TennCare eligibility files available for our analysis distinguish between the two groups. Based on aggregate SSI enrollment figures, approximately 65% of the population for this study were receiving SSI payments in 1993. 12 Similarities in expenditure levels may be due to conditions comorbid with blindness. For example, diabetes can cause blindness. 13 Mean expenditures for those who left TennCare or became dually eligible during our analysis period (and thus were excluded from our sample) were nearly 60% higher ($364). This difference is due largely to the high cost of those who died in 1993 and the older age of those who became dually eligible. As noted, to the extent that we could examine the distribution of this group among TennCare plans, it was very similar to the distribution in our analysis sample. 14 These exclusions pertain to the early years of TennCare, 1994 through 1996. All mental health services were included in the TennCare Partners program, which began in July 1996. Home-and community-based waiver services, less than 1% of Tennessee's fiscal year 1993 Medicaid budget, also were excluded from TennCare plans' benefits, but we could not identify these in the claims data, so they were included in our risk index. 15 This pattern is obscured in the statewide statistics because a greater proportion of AFDC families than SSI beneficiaries live in urban areas.
